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Negotiating privileged partnerships: EU-Switzerland 
relations and the joined-up approach in practice 
Alexandre Veuthey  
In recent years, the European Union’s (EU) neighbours have 
increasingly demanded to deepen their access to the 
internal market. In response, the EU has called for a further 
institutionalisation of its relations with these countries. 
These institutionalised relationships, labelled as ‘privileged 
partnerships’, involve “extensive reciprocal rights and 
obligations, selective acquis adoption, policy cooperation 
and integration” (Gstöhl and Phinnemore 2019, 5). They 
may also include “bilateral institutions, surveillance and 
possibly even judicial enforcement arrangements, dispute 
settlement mechanisms and in certain instances privileged 
‘decision-shaping’ access to EU institutions, bodies and 
agencies” (ibid.). The EU is currently negotiating such 
partnerships with Switzerland and the small-sized states 
Andorra, Monaco and San Marino. Negotiations with the 
United Kingdom (UK) on the future framework governing 
their relations also seem to follow the model of privileged 
partnerships, since also in this case the EU makes deeper 
access to its internal market conditional on the 
institutionalisation of relations.    
 
In the past, negotiations with Switzerland and the UK, two 
sovereignty-prone countries, have proved challenging for the 
EU, in particular with regard to the institutional arrangements 
the Union desired. In this policy brief, I argue that the EU can 
strengthen its position in these negotiations by developing a 
stronger external coherence. Drawing on Gebhard’s (2017) 
typology of EU external coherence, I focus on the horizontal 
and internal types of coherence. While horizontal coherence 
refers to the concertation between the supranational and the 
intergovernmental spheres of EU external action, internal 
coherence concerns the institutional coordination between 
the different areas of the EU’s external relations.  
 
The objective to enhance the EU’s coherence in its external 
relations was at the heart of the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy. In 
this document, the EU explicitly underlined its will to better 
integrate its diverse forms of external relations by stating that 
one of the tools to develop a more effective external action 
was to become “more joined-up across our external policies, 
between Member States and EU institutions, and between 
the internal and external dimensions of our policies” 
(European External Action Service 2016, 11). 
 
Focusing on EU-Switzerland relations and the negotiations of 
an Institutional Framework Agreement (InstA), this policy 
Executive Summary 
> The European Union’s 2016 Global Strategy calls 
for a more ‘joined-up’ approach – that is, for 
greater coherence – in the EU’s external action. 
One aspect of this coherence concerns the strategic 
link between sectoral cooperation with third 
countries, such as participation in EU programmes, 
and matters of foreign policy more broadly (e.g. a 
diplomatic dispute). 
> The EU’s ‘privileged partnerships’ with 
neighbouring countries offer them deeper market 
access in exchange for the institutionalisation of 
their relations with the EU. A case in which the EU 
has in recent years successfully managed to deploy 
a joined-up approach in this regard is its 
relationship with Switzerland. The EU is in 
particular linking further sectoral cooperation to 
the signature of an ‘Institutional Framework 
Agreement’. This joined-up approach was 
facilitated by a significant degree of internal 
coordination and centralisation. 
> Whereas the EU’s wish to engage in a consistent 
approach towards non-EU partners that participate 
in the extended Internal Market, stressing the 
balance of rights and obligations, is 
understandable, it increases the third countries’ 
costs of non-compliance with the EU’s position. 
This may, in turn, reduce the EU’s attractiveness in 
those countries and also lead to the loss of benefits 
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brief offers an analysis of whether and how the EU indeed 
follows its objective of developing a more coherent – joined-
up – approach in relations with third countries. While 
analysing EU diplomatic practice vis-à-vis one major partner 
country in Europe, this policy brief sheds light on how the EU 
could manage its relations with other neighbouring countries 
seeking privileged partnerships similar to Switzerland’s, that 
is, extensive access to the Single Market without EU 
membership. It first conceptualises the joined-up approach 
and then discusses three instances where a more joined-up 
and coherent approach can be observed in this bilateral 
relationship: sectoral agreements, sectoral cooperation and 
the EU’s own internal organisation. In particular, the EU has 
linked the negotiation of market access agreements to the 
prior signature of the InstA. The policy brief concludes by 
discussing the implications of the findings for EU diplomatic 
practices and relations with third countries more generally.  
 
Conceptualising the joined-up approach 
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the EU’s external 
influence has mainly developed along two axes: foreign policy 
and sectoral policies. Foreign policy encompasses the 
development of traditional, state-like, diplomatic relations, 
for instance via the creation, in 2010, of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) alongside the development, 
since the early 1990s, of a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). Yet, the EU also exerts its influence in third 
countries through cooperation within policy sectors and the 
diffusion of its sector-specific rules and norms. These two 
vectors of influence, foreign policy and sectoral cooperation, 
have evolved independently from each other and with 
varying degrees of success.  
 
On the one hand, even though the EU has made advances in 
foreign policy and diplomatic capabilities, it is still often 
referred to as primarily an ‘economic giant, but a political 
dwarf’ in international affairs. On the other hand, facing the 
slowdown in the enlargement process and the presence of 
countries asking for association below the threshold of 
membership, the EU has sought alternative means to export 
its norms and practices to third countries. This ‘functionalist 
extension’ (Lavenex 2014), which operates through the 
externalisation of EU norms, rules and practices to third 
countries thanks to political-administrative and socio-
economic mechanisms of external governance, has proved to 
be an effective vector of influence for the EU beyond its 
borders. The purpose of the joined-up approach promoted by 
the Global Strategy is to bundle EU capabilities by integrating 
its foreign policy and external sectoral cooperation, thereby 
enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of its external 
action. 
 
In this context, the term ‘joined-up approach’ expresses the 
wish to better integrate the EU’s sectoral cooperation with a 
third country and its general foreign policy vis-à-vis that 
country. In the negotiation of privileged partnerships, the 
EU’s joined-up approach is understood as a practice which, 
through significant degrees of horizontal coherence 
(between the oftentimes supranational sectoral policies and 
the intergovernmental CFSP) and of internal coherence (via 
inter-institutional coordination between different areas of EU 
external action), links deeper market access for third 
countries with further institutionalisation of their relations 
with the EU. 
 
The negotiations with Switzerland offer a paradigmatic case 
for studying the emergence of such a joined-up approach. 
Since the Swiss failure to ratify the European Economic Area 
(EEA) Agreement by popular vote in 1992, the EU and 
Switzerland have developed a unique kind of partnership 
governed through an increasing number of bilateral sectoral 
agreements. The resulting relationship has for a long time 
mainly been regarded as technocratic in nature. However, 
the success in 2014 of a popular initiative against ‘mass 
migration’ spiked tensions in EU-Swiss relations. The vote 
prevented the Swiss government from signing the Protocol 
extending the EU-Swiss agreement on the free movement of 
persons to Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013. The EU made 
an apparent link between the signature of this Protocol and 
Switzerland’s participation in Erasmus + and Horizon 2020 
(European Commission 2014, 27, 30). As a result, Switzerland 
was excluded by the EU from participation in the Erasmus + 
programme and was only partially associated to Horizon 
2020. The government finally sought to reconcile the 
required change of the Federal Constitution with the bilateral 
agreement on the free movement of persons by opting for a 
‘light’ implementation which gives priority to Swiss residents 
in job recruitment.  
 
Nevertheless, this politicisation of EU-Swiss relations has 
continued during the negotiations on the InstA, which aims at 
providing an institutional umbrella for the governance of 
current and future mutual market access agreements. The 
reluctance of the Swiss Federal Council to endorse the 
Agreement at the end of negotiations in December 2018 led 
the EU to call some aspects of their sectoral cooperation into 
question, such as the non-extension of the Swiss stock 
exchange equivalence. This hints at a joined-up approach by 
the EU as it links a technical issue to a political disagreement, 
i.e. the signature of the InstA.  
 
The joined-up approach in EU-Swiss relations is now 
examined by means of three different aspects related to 
horizontal and internal coherence. The first one is sectoral 
agreements signed between the EU and Switzerland on a 
specific policy. These agreements in sectors such as trade, 
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free movement of persons or transport offer mutual market 
access. They may also provide for Swiss participation in EU 
programmes such as the EU Research and Innovation 
Framework Programme. The negotiations and signature of 
such agreements call for horizontal coherence on the EU side. 
The Council gives the Commission the mandate to negotiate 
these agreements, which requires concertation between 
these two institutions. Joined-up action in this case would 
imply that the EU has made the negotiation or signing of 
sectoral agreements conditional on the institutionalisation of 
relations.  
 
Another aspect, which requires horizontal and internal 
coherence, is sectoral cooperation involving EU-Swiss 
technocratic cooperation on a sectoral policy. Sectoral 
cooperation means permanent collaboration in areas where 
an agreement is already in force between Switzerland and the 
EU. Formal cooperation takes place through the joint 
committees, which are responsible for the implementation 
and adaptation of the bilateral agreements. Another instance 
of sectoral cooperation is the Swiss officials’ access to EU 
expert groups, which assist the Commission in the 
preparation and implementation of EU legislation. Indicators 
of EU joined-up action in this area would be a suspension of 
joint committees or of Swiss officials’ access to EU expert 
groups because of the Swiss refusal to sign the InstA. As the 
joint committees are enshrined in legal texts, a suspension of 
their work due to the deadlock in negotiations would be an 
indicator of a strong joined-up approach. Swiss technocrats’ 
access to the expert groups is often less legally formalised.  
 
Finally, a joined-up approach is also reflected in how 
coherently the EU is organised internally. Therefore, the last 
aspect to investigate is the EU’s internal organisation in terms 
of both coordination and centralisation. This dimension 
encompasses horizontal and internal coherence, as it consists 
of coordination between the different institutions and areas 
of the EU’s external action. Joined-up coordination can be 
observed if the different Commission Directorates General 
(DG) and the EEAS coordinate their cooperation with 
Switzerland. Further, if an EU institution (the Commission or 
the EEAS) takes the lead in supervising and controlling 
bilateral relations with Switzerland, this would be a sign of 
centralisation aimed at joining up EU external action.  
 
The Institutional (Dis-)Agreement 
 
The current model of EU-Switzerland relations finds its origins 
in the negative popular vote regarding Switzerland’s 
accession to the EEA in 1992. Since then, the EU and 
Switzerland have signed multiple bilateral agreements to 
develop their relations, which are mainly market access-
related. Under the bilateral agreements, Switzerland does 
not have to adopt new EU acquis, with exceptions like 
Schengen, nor to follow the full Court of Justice of the EU’s 
(CJEU) jurisprudence, and there is no supervisory authority, 
nor judicial dispute settlement mechanism. However, the EU 
increasingly grants extended access to the internal market in 
exchange of certain obligations such as a ‘dynamic’ approach 
to the relationship, independent surveillance, judicial 
enforcement, a dispute settlement mechanism and a 
homogeneous interpretation of the agreements (Baur 2019, 
28-29). As a result, the two parties have negotiated an InstA, 
which aims to consolidate actual and future mutual market 
access by “protecting the homogeneity of the internal market 
and ensuring legal certainty for authorities, citizens and 
economic operators” (Council of the EU 2014) through the 
institutionalisation of EU-Switzerland relations. This 
agreement follows the principle of a balance of rights and 
obligations for access to the internal market, which is an 
integral part of the EU’s ‘privileged partnerships’.  
 
In December 2018, the negotiations ended with a draft 
agreement. The agreement applies to five current market 
access agreements: the free movement of persons, land 
transport, air transport, technical trade barriers, and 
agriculture – as well as all future market access agreements. 
Furthermore, it introduces a dispute settlement mechanism 
with an arbitration tribunal and ensures that relevant 
developments in EU law are incorporated into the 
agreement. This mechanism should, however, respect 
Switzerland’s decision-making procedures. Although this 
draft agreement does not introduce all five obligations 
mentioned above (see Baur 2019 for a detailed analysis), it 
nevertheless represents a significant improvement over the 
current structure of bilateral agreements regarding the 
balance of rights and obligations for access to the internal 
market. Instead of endorsing the Agreement at the end of the 
negotiations, the Federal Council decided to conduct 
consultations with various relevant stakeholders, who had 
voiced discontent with specific parts of the InstA, notably the 
state subsidies, the flanking measures for posted workers and 
the obligation to adopt the EU citizens’ rights directive 
(Federal Council 2018). These consultations eventually led to 
requests for clarification to ensure sufficient support among 
the Swiss population (Federal Council 2019).  
 
The EU has shown signs of exasperation towards the Swiss 
position. Then Commission President Juncker stated in June 
2019 that discussions and declarations could be undertaken 
to clarify certain parts of the InstA, but that the Agreement 
would not be re-negotiated (Juncker 2019). As a result, the 
EU and Switzerland are currently facing a disagreement on 
the appropriate model to frame the governance of their 
relationship, i.e. the InstA. This political context coupled with 
the sectoral-based structure of EU-Switzerland relations 
provides a useful case for scrutinising whether and how the 
EU develops a joined-up approach vis-à-vis third countries.  
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EU external action towards Switzerland 
 
The following analysis of the abovementioned three aspects 
of EU-Swiss relations shows an increasing EU joined-up 
approach. This strong trend does of course not preclude that 
sectoral cooperation in some areas may still function rather 
independently from the overarching foreign policy debates 




Regarding the sectoral agreements, the EU’s joined-up 
approach is illustrated by its decision to make the conclusion 
of the Institutional Framework Agreement a precondition for 
the negotiation of new as well as for the further development 
of existing market access agreements. This approach was 
already used earlier with the Council of the EU stating in 2008 
that “in assessing the balance of interests in concluding 
additional agreements, the Council will have in mind the need 
to ensure parallel progress in all areas of cooperation” 
(Council of the EU 2008). However, the ex-ante conditionality 
applied by the EU has become stronger and broader since 
2014. Indeed, the EU has frozen not only the negotiations of 
new market access agreements, e.g. in the field of electricity, 
but also the talks on updating the current ones, such as the 
Mutual Recognition Agreements, which would have a 
significant impact on Swiss exports.  
 
Switzerland’s participation in EU programmes has also been 
affected. In the research and innovation sector, there has 
been a lot of uproar when the European Commission 
published its proposal for a regulation establishing ‘Horizon 
Europe’, the new framework programme for research and 
innovation, in 2018. Indeed, in the article establishing the 
association of third countries with the programme, 
Switzerland is no longer part of the category ‘European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA)’ but is now in the ‘third countries’ 
category (European Commission 2018). This change of group 
implies the conclusion of a stricter agreement covering the 
Swiss participation in the programme that could restrain 
Switzerland’s involvement in particular domains. The link 
between Switzerland’s association status to Horizon Europe 
and the InstA is blurry. EU officials have argued that it is 
merely a reorganisation of third countries’ participation 
according to the type of agreements they have with the EU 
and that it has nothing to do with the InstA. Switzerland could 
simply no longer be in the same category as the other EFTA 
countries which are members of the EEA.  
 
Overall, the EU has clearly made sectoral agreements 






The EU has in the past hardly used the participation of Swiss 
technocrats in EU expert groups in a joined-up way. 
Historically, the Swiss expertise is appreciated in Brussels. As 
a result, it has been common that Swiss experts are invited to 
participate in EU expert groups even though there is often no 
legal basis for such a participation. Recently, this informal 
participation right has been revoked for Swiss experts, 
especially in the health sector, where they are no longer 
allowed to participate.  
 
There are two sides to this measure. On the one hand, it puts 
pressure on the Swiss to sign the InstA. On the other hand, 
according to EU and Swiss officials, this is also linked to Brexit, 
as the EU does not want the UK to exploit this informal 
practice and demand similar access. In sectors where there is 
a legal basis for Swiss participation, such as research and the 
movement of persons (Schengen area/Dublin Regulation), 
there has been no such revocation of the right to participate. 
The sectoral joint committees have not been affected by the 
dispute around the Institutional Framework Agreement.  
 
Internal organisation of the EU 
 
In its internal functioning, the EU has recently demonstrated 
coordination and a high degree of centralisation in the 
conduct of its relations with Switzerland. The EEAS organises 
internal meetings bringing together all EU staff working with 
Switzerland in sectoral areas. During these meetings, each 
policy officer gives a briefing on the cooperation with 
Switzerland in the respective sector. With these meetings, 
the EEAS ensures close coordination across all sectoral 
policies towards Switzerland.  
 
The most striking aspect in the development of a joined-up 
approach towards Switzerland is, however, the strong 
centralisation of EU action under the responsibility of the 
Commission’s Secretariat-General (SG). An internal memo 
sent to EU staff in 2015 requires that the SG must first 
approve any action or decision concerning Switzerland. As a 
result, individual Directorates-General cannot take any 
initiative without getting the Secretariat-General’s 
endorsement, which ensures a common approach across all 
sectors of cooperation with Switzerland. As the SG has 
imposed a hard line against Switzerland, linking sectoral 
cooperation to progress on the InstA, sectoral cooperation 
has been negatively affected by this.  
 
Altogether, this centralisation under the SG’s lead therefore 
represents a significant factor in the joined-up approach 
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Conclusion and policy implications  
 
This policy brief has shown that the EU has started to use the 
joined-up approach to put pressure on Switzerland to sign the 
InstA, which intends to ensure greater homogeneity 
regarding access to the Single Market. This is evidenced by a 
high degree of coordination of all services involved in these 
bilateral relations, as well as stronger centralisation, which 
enhances the coherence of EU action. The EU has also made 
the conclusion of negotiations on current and future market 
access agreements conditional on the signing of the InstA. 
However, this approach came at the price of a further drop in 
positive perceptions of the EU in Switzerland.  
 
The case of EU-Switzerland relations can be instructive for the 
way the EU tries to act in a joined-up way vis-à-vis other third 
countries in similar negotiations. By suspending or limiting 
the sectoral participation of third countries in EU policies, the 
EU increases the costs for a third country to not accept the 
obligations, i.e. institutionalisation, that come with the 
benefits, i.e. access to the internal market, of their 
partnership with the EU. The joined-up approach can also 
have internal effects abroad as the third countries’ interest 
groups might put pressure on their government to resume 
cooperation.  
 
The study of the Swiss case in particular brings to the fore 
Brexit and how it has impacted the EU’s action towards third 
countries seeking substantial market access. Indeed, the 
departure of a member state has risked threatening the 
European integration process as such. Switzerland, being a 
non-EU European country with strong access to the Single 
Market, represents a potential alternative path of integration 
for countries pursuing similar objectives, that is, access to the 
Single Market without EU membership. The EU now seems to 
link the different negotiations with third countries in order to 
avoid setting any precedent tying its hands in the future.  
 
The EU’s decision to change Switzerland’s status from ‘EFTA 
country’ to ‘third country’ in Horizon Europe can be 
interpreted in this way. It seems likely that the re-
organisation is linked to the EU’s re-definition of its relations 
with the UK. If one considers the participation in Horizon 
2020 projects, the UK ranks second among all EU member 
states. It is therefore not in the EU’s interest to give the UK 
privileged access to Horizon Europe, as this could result in a 
significant amount of money being invested in non-EU 
research institutions. Thus, the UK would also be placed in the 
category of ‘third countries’. A specific agreement would then 
have to be negotiated between the EU and the UK to regulate 
the British participation in Horizon Europe, allowing the EU to 
better control the scope of UK participation in the EU’s 
Research Framework Programme. This move would also 
allow the EU to enhance the value of EEA membership, 
helping the Norwegian government to better sell the benefits 
of EEA membership to a critical domestic audience. 
 
This contribution can also be connected to the debates on the 
future of Europe and differentiated integration (Leuffen et al. 
2013). Indeed, the EU seems to make the participation of 
third countries in its Single Market and related policies 
conditional on a stronger alignment with the EU acquis. In this 
respect, the joined-up approach can be seen as an instrument 
to ensure a level playing field – a point that plays an 
important role in the EU-UK negotiations on a future 
partnership. While the joined-up approach can be effective in 
negotiating ‘privileged partnerships’, it could come at the 
price of losing the benefits of external differentiated 
integration for the EU. By suspending or limiting external 
sectoral cooperation in certain areas, the EU might lose the 
advantages of functional collaboration with interdependent 
third countries, such as Switzerland or the UK. This might also 
lead to a loss of external expertise for the EU, as illustrated 




















Theorising the ENP – Conference Report 
© Author name 
CEPOB # 1.15 December 2015 
Negotiating privileged partn rshi s: EU-Switzerland relations and the joined-up approach in 
practice © Alexandre Veuthey  































Views expressed in the College of Europe Policy Briefs are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect positions 




Baur, G. 2019. “Privileged partnerships: The partner countries’ (institutional) 
perspectives”. The Proliferation of Privileged Partnerships between the European 
Union and its Neighbours, edited by Gstöhl, S. & D. Phinnemore. London: Routledge.  
Council of the European Union. 2008. “Council Conclusions on EU relations with EFTA 
countries”, 16651/1/08, Brussels, 5 December.  
Council of the European Union. 2014 “Negotiating Mandate for an EU-Switzerland 
Institutional Framework Agreement”, Press Release 9525/14, Brussels, 6 May. 
European Commission. 2014. “Midday press briefing from 17/02/2014”, Brussels. 
Video filmed on 17 February 2014. https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-
086370 (last accessed 15 December 2020).  
European Commission. 2018. “Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for 
Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination”, 
COM(2018) 435, Brussels, 7 June 2018. 
European External Action Service. 2016. “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger 
Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, 
Brussels, 28 June 2016.  
Federal Council. 2018. “European policy - Federal Council decides to launch 
consultations on the draft institutional agreement”, Bern, 7 December 2018.  
Federal Council. 2019. “Letter to Jean-Claude Juncker: Institutional Agreement 
between Switzerland and the European Union”, Bern, 7 June 2019. 
Gebhard, C. 2017. “The Problem of Coherence in the European Union’s International 
Relations”. International Relations and the European Union, edited by Hill, C., M. Smith 
and S. Vanhoonacker, 3rd ed. 123-142. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gstöhl, S & D. Phinnemore. 2019. The Proliferation of Privileged Partnerships between 
the European Union and its Neighbours. London: Routledge.   
Juncker, J.-C. 2019. “Letter from the President of the European Commission to the 
Federal Council”, Brussels, 11 June 2019.  
Lavenex, S. 2014. “The power of functionalist extension: how EU rules travel”, Journal 
of European Public Policy,  21 (6): 885–903. 
Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B. and Schimmelfennig, F. 2013. Differentiated Integration: 
Explaining Variation in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
 
 




(Alexandre.Veuthey@unige.ch) is a 
PhD candidate and teaching assistant 
at the Global Studies Institute, 
University of Geneva. He is currently 
writing a dissertation under the 
supervision of Prof. Sandra Lavenex, on 
whether, and under what conditions, 
the EU manages to develop a joined-up 
approach towards different 
neighbouring countries. He holds an 
MA in European Studies from the 
University of Geneva and a BA in 
Political Science from the University of 
Lausanne. His main research interests 
include EU external relations, 
diplomacy, external governance, 
conflict resolution and EU 
neighbourhood policies. 
 
 
